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Western European income per capita more than tripled in the 
two and a half decades that followed World War II. The 
scholarship has identified several potential factors behind this 
outstanding growth episode, specifically; the large migrations 
from agriculture to manufacture that took place in post-war 
Europe, the contribution of the Marshall Plan combined with the 
public provision of infrastructure and the surge of intra-European 
trade. This paper can be viewed as an attempt to formalize and 
quantify the direct contribution of these factors to the outstanding 
growth of the European Golden Age. Our conclusions highlight 
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1.  Introduction 
The group of Western European economies most directly affected by the 
devastation of World War II witnessed a period of outstanding growth and stability in the 
two decades that followed the conflict. Since then, economists have been trying to 
understand the sources behind this Golden Age of European growth. Our objective is to 
explore the quantitative plausibility of some of the hypotheses presented in this literature. 
On one hand this exercise strengthens our confidence in the relevance of the destruction 
of capital approach to account for post-war growth
1, on the other hand our analysis 
complements this approach by providing quantitative evidence on the relative importance 
of some of the additional forces behind the post-war European record. 
  Between 1945 and 1970 income per capita grew at an average rate of 6.69% per 
year in Austria, 6.62% in Germany, 5.64% in Italy, 4.61% in France, 4.12% in the 
Netherlands
2. At these rates Austrian and German income per capita double every 
decade, Italian doubles every twelve years and French and Dutch production needs a 
decade and a half to double. Furthermore, this period was characterized by important 
increases in the capital-output ratio, a substantial redistribution of income between factors 
and variations in the levels of saving and investment.  
The scholarship has pointed out several explanations for this outstanding episode 
of growth and stability.  Some authors highlight the importance of the structural 
transformation of traditional economies, with substantial reallocations of resources from 
the agricultural sector to modern manufactures. Another set of scholars emphasizes the 
importance of the Marshall Plan and public investment as a key stimulus to growth. 
Finally, another stream of literature points to the relation between the Golden Age growth 
and the surge of intra-European trade, after a period of more than twenty years 
characterized by autarkic practices
3. 
                                                 
1 See Christiano (1989), Alvarez-Cuadrado (2004) 
2 The growth rates of other European countries that did not experience substantial losses of physical capital 
during the conflict are consistently lower, 3.1% in Norway, around 3% in Switzerland, Sweden and 
Denmark, and 1.95% in Britain.  
3 The literature has identified other potential factors behind the Golden Age growth. Olson (1982) argues 
that the conflict destroyed lobbying coalitions and delayed the development of new ones, limiting the 
power of interest groups and the extent of the redistributional struggle. Abramovitz (1986) emphasizes the 
importance of “social capability” combined with a technological gap. This last argument falls within the 
explanations for the European miracle that stress the importance of a steady state gap, as the reconstruction 
hypothesis. In the first group, Kindleberger’s (1967), Saint-Paul (1993), Giersch, Paque and 
Schmieding (1993), Temple (2001) and Temin (2002) point to the substantial reallocation 
of resources from agricultural to nonagricultural activities that took place in post-war 
Europe as one of the key factors behind the exceptional growth record. The destructive 
impact of the war, breaking all sorts of preexisting ties, might have contributed to some 
degree to these intense migrations. 
During the cold war years some scholars sought to demonstrate a cause-effect 
relation between the Marshall Plan and the remarkable economic performance in post-
war Europe. Mayne (1973), Gimbel (1976) and Mee (1984) argue that the Marshall Aid 
provided enough funds to finance public expenditure, to eliminate bottlenecks that 
obstructed economic growth and to guarantee the needed flow of imports. The 
combination of the Plan with the observed expansion in the provision of public capital 
during the early fifties might account for some important features of the post-war 
performance.  
  Finally, Jensen (1967), Llewellyn and Potter (1982), Hennings (1982), Van 
Rijckeghem (1982), Milward (1984), Giersch et al. (1993) emphasize the relation 
between technological innovations, intra-European trade and export-led growth as a key 
determinant of this successful episode. 
  In this paper we make use of fully specified models to quantify the plausibility of 
the aforementioned hypotheses. We evaluate them along several dimensions, comparing 
their implications with the stylized facts of post-war Europe identified by Alvarez-
Cuadrado (2004). Our results suggest that the direct effects of labor reallocation, the 
Marshall Plan and the process of European integration, although significant, cannot 
account for most of the growth of the European Golden Age.   
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents the stylized facts of the 
Golden Age of European growth. Section 3 quantifies the contribution of structural 
change as a key source of output growth. Section 4 analyzes the potential effects of the 
Marshall Plan and infrastructure investment. Section 5 focuses in the role played by 
international trade and the conclusions are summarized in Section 7. 
 
2.  The stylized facts of the Golden Age of European growth. 
In the two decades following World War II western European economies experienced 
a unique episode of uninterrupted growth and stability. Between 1950 and 1970 income per capita almost tripled in Germany, Austria and Italy and more than doubled in France 
and the Netherlands. The high rate of growth of income was accompanied by important 
increases in capital intensity, substantial changes in the distribution of income between 
factors, and variations in the saving and investment rates. 
Table 1 and Figure 1 illustrate the evolution of the growth rate, capital-output ratio, 
saving rate and labor income share during the European Golden Age for a group of 
economies directly affected by the war (Austria, Germany, Italy, France and the 
Netherlands). In order to better illustrate the common patterns of the European economies 
we reproduce the evolution of those same variables for other OECD economies which 
arguably are moving along their stable growth path. We recognize the following stylized 
facts characterizing the post-war Western European experience: 
-  Stylized fact 1. The Golden Age is characterized by high and slowly decreasing 
growth rates. 
-  Stylized fact 2. Between 1955 and 1970 the capital-output ratio smoothly 
increases
4. 
-  Stylized fact 3. The saving rate exhibits a characteristic inverted u-shape. During 
the first years monotonically increases reaching its maximum after more than a 
decade, thereafter slowly decreases. 
-  Stylized fact 4. The wage share exhibits an upward trend, increasing on average 
above 12% in the period considered. 
A priori these facts are broadly consistent with some of the arguments suggested in 
the literature. If the productivity of labor and capital intensity is higher in manufacture 
than agriculture, large migrations from rural to industrial areas might lead to substantial 
increases in output, capital-output ratio and wage share. Increases in public infrastructure 
can lead to a period of private investment and growth. Finally, growing volume of 
international trade allows an economy to shift resources into more productive uses, 
fosters competence limiting the power of domestic monopolies, increases the size of the 
market enabling important economies of scale to be realized and accelerates the process 
of technological diffusion, all these factors might be translated into substantial increases 
in income per capita. 
 
3. Large migrations from agriculture to the manufacturing sector. 
                                                 
4 Alvarez-Cuadrado (2004) provides alternative rationalizations for the initial dip in the capital-income 
ratio. Several authors point to the substantial reallocation of resources from agricultural 
to nonagricultural activities that took place in post-war Europe as one of the key factors 
behind the outstanding growth record of this period. The destructive impact of the war, 
breaking all sorts of preexisting ties, might have contributed to some degree to this 
intense reallocation of the labor force. 
Along these lines, Saint-Paul (1993) points to these massive migrations as one of 
the key determinants of the performance of total factor productivity in post-war France. 
Furthermore he claims that, as opposed to Great Britain, there is a sense in which France 
joined the industrial revolution only after the end of the conflict. Giersch, Paque and 
Schmieding (1993) highlight the importance of internal migrations, mainly among 
refugees and expellees from the East who were initially allocated in rural areas, for the 
German growth record. Kindleberger’s (1967) thesis is that the major factor shaping the 
remarkable economic growth of post-war Europe has been the availability of a large 
supply of labor. Temin (2002) argues that high growth of the European Golden Age 
reflects the end of the misallocation of resources generated by the interwar autarkic 
model. At the end of the war, Continental Europe had too much labor in agriculture for its 
level of income and stage of development. As a result, the post-war period was 
characterized by large migrations, important gains in efficiency and outstanding growth. 
Finally, Temple (2001) extends the standard growth accounting framework to measure 
the contribution of labor reallocations to total factor productivity growth. He reports 
estimates of the lower bound of the (direct) contribution of labor reallocation to aggregate 
total factor productivity growth close to one percentage point for this decade. 
As an example, in Italy the share of population devoted to agriculture decreased 
from 40% in 1950 to 18% in 1970. Figure 2 summarizes the evolution of the share of the 
labor force devoted to agriculture for our sample economies and the control group. In 
post-war Europe almost 17% of the population migrated from the countryside to urban 
areas, while this figure is below 8% in our control group. 
Assuming that the productivity of labor and capital intensity are higher in 
manufactures than in agriculture
5, large migrations from rural to industrial areas might 
lead to substantial increases in output, capital-output ratio and wage share, consistent 
with the stylized facts of the post-war period. Particularly we are interested in whether 
this migration process is able to account for the substantial increase in the income share 
                                                 
5 Gollin, Parente and Rogerson (2002) report that output per worker in non-agriculture is substantially 
higher than in agriculture.  of labor (stylized fact 4), without the need to make further assumptions about the 
production technology. In order to explore this hypothesis, we borrow the model from 
Gollin, Parente and Rogerson (2002). 
 
3.1 A model of structural change. 
They extend a one-sector neoclassical growth model to include an explicit 
agricultural sector. Their economy is populated by an infinitely-lived representative 
agent, that derives satisfaction from the consumption of a non-agricultural good (  and 
a non-storable agricultural good 
) t C
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   (3.1) 
where 0 σ > is a measure of the willingness of the representative agent to shift 
consumption over time. 
 Agricultural output(  is produced using labor  ) at Y ( ) at N  and land (  that for 
simplicity remains fixed in supply. The efficiency of labor in this sector (  grows 
exponentially at the exogenous rate
) T
) at E
a γ . These factors are combined according to the 
following Cobb-Douglas technology: 
()( )
1
at a at at YB TE N
α α − =     (3.2) 
Output from the agricultural sector can only be consumed, so the agriculture resource 
constraint is simply at Y ≤ A .  In the early stages of development all the labor force is 
employed in agriculture, as output per capita in the agricultural sector reaches  A, labor 
will migrate to the manufacturing sector. Our preferences capture the idea that once a 
society reaches a certain level of nutrition there is little room for expanding agricultural 
production beyond the increases necessary to provide for the additional population. 
In the limit agriculture’s employment share shrinks to zero and the model 
converges to the one-sector neoclassical model. 
The manufacturing sector produces output ( ) mt Y  combining capital ( and labor  ) t K
( ) mt N  according to the neoclassical technology: () ( )
1
mt m t mt mt YB KE N
μ μ − =     (3.3) 
Technological change in the manufacturing sector increases the efficiency of 
labor  at the exogenous rate ( mt E ) m γ . 
Output from the manufacturing sector can be used for consumption or investment, 
and therefore the law of motion for the stock of capital, that depreciates a constant rateδ , 
is 
   tm tt t K YC K δ =− − &      (3.4) 
Finally, the representative agent inelastically supplies a unit of labor(  that can 
be allocated into two alternative uses, agriculture 
) N
( ) at N and manufactures ( ) mt N . 
 
3.2 Macroeconomic equilibrium. 
Solving for the competitive equilibrium involves two steps. The first step 
determines the evolution of the labor allocation across sectors. Preferences imply that 
labor will be allocated entirely to the agricultural sector until  at YA = . Once this critical 
level is reached, the labor force will migrate to the manufacture sector at the rate of 
technological change in agriculture
6. Therefore the proportion of labor force employed in 













     (3.5) 
Having the time path for labor allocations, the second step solves for the optimal 
consumption rule. The optimality conditions for this problem, where β  is the rate of time 














     (3.6b) 
together with the transversality condition 





→∞ =      (3.6c) 
                                                 
6 Given that we are focusing on economies where the initial level of manufacturing output is non-trivial, the 
problems of (3.1) for small levels of consumption and of (3.3) for initial level of capital are ignored, 
without affecting the relevance of our results. Furthermore, we assume a constant level of population, 
although our results are still valid under a constant rate of population growth. The interpretations of (3.6a) and (3.6b) are standard; (3.6a) equates the marginal 
utility of consumption to the shadow value of capital, while (3.6b) is an intertemporal 
allocation condition equating the marginal product of capital to the rate of return on 
consumption. 
In line with the literature, we define a balanced growth path as being one along 
which all variables grow at a constant rate. With capital being accumulated from final 
output, the only balanced solution is one in which the capital-output ratio, K /Y, remains 
constant. Following this definition it is convenient to write the system in terms of the 





≡≡ . Combining these variables with 
(3.3), (3.4),(3.5) and (3.6), the dynamic behavior of the economy can be described by a 
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aa N γ =− &         (3.7c) 
Imposing the steady state condition,  0 a ckN = == & & & , we can solve (3.7) for the steady-
state values of the scale-adjusted variables, k
* *
*
 and c , and the equilibrium labor 















     (3.8a) 
() ()
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m cB k k
μ
δγ =− −       (3.8b) 
* 0 a N =        (3.8c) Since we are interested in evaluating the dynamic behavior of an economy 
starting at a point that lies far away from steady state, the conventional reliance on linear 
approximations might lead to substantial errors
7. Under these circumstances we decided 
to solve numerically the non-linear system of differential equations that governs the 
dynamics of our economy. 
 
3.3 Numerical Analysis. 
  Following Judd’s (1992) collocation method, we use an eight degree Chebyschev 
polynomial basis to approximate the solution of (3.7).  Denoting these approximate 
solutions for consumption, capital and labor share in agriculture as  and  , 
respectively, we define our residual functions as the difference between the left hand side 
and the right hand side of (3.7). Twenty seven residual conditions are derived for nine 
time nodes and three additional conditions are determined by (3.6c), the initial capital 
stock and the initial share of labor in agriculture. As a result we end up with a system of 
30 linear equations on the 30 unknown coefficients of the approximate time paths. We 
solve this system using Broyden’s method. Finally we evaluate our solution over a set of 
10,000 points over an interval of 200 periods, the maximum consumption residual is 
0.0003 that in relative terms implies an error of 2 cents out of every $100 worth of 
consumption. 
ˆ ˆ, ck ˆ
a N
  We calibrate our model to reproduce some of the key features of the post-war 
western European economies economies. Table 2 summarizes the parameters upon which 
our simulations are based and the steady state values of some relevant economic 
variables. Since our production technologies do not exhibit scale effect we normalize 
. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution,  1 am BB == 10 . 4 σ = , and the rate of time 
preference are chosen so that the steady state interest rate is 7% and the equilibrium 
savings rate is around 24%. We set the rate of technological change in the manufacturing 
sector, 0.02 m γ = , to be consistent with the average growth rate of our sample economies 
over the last century
8. The constant rate of depreciation is assumed to be 5%. The 
parameter  a γ is set so that the model tracks the evolution of the sectoral allocation of 
                                                 
7 We still use a linear approximation of (3.7) around (3.8) to calculate the asymptotic speed of convergence 
represented by the larger negative eigenvalue. This information is used to transform the infinite horizon 
problem into an equivalent finite horizon one. 
8 Maddison (2001) reports the following average growth rates of per capita real output for the twentieth 
century; Austria, 1.96%, France, 2.02%, Germany, 1.87%, Italy 2.32% and Netherlands, 1.84%. labor between 1950 and 1970
9. We choose a value of  A so that the model matches the 
share of agricultural production in total output during the 50’s. In the manufacturing 
sector the capital share parameter, μ , is set to 0.4 in line with the calculations of Cooley 
and Prescott (1995). The empirical evidence on agricultural labor income shares is 
difficult to interpret as a measure to calibrate the elasticity of agricultural production to 
labor given the high degree of under-employment (family workers, illegal immigration) 
that characterizes this sector. Our base calibration is based in Schulz (1951) calculations 
of the relative amounts of inputs employed for agricultural production, which leads to a 
value of the labor income share in the agricultural sector, ( ) 1 α −  equal to 0.45. Solow 
(1958) reports the share of compensation of employees in income originated in 
agriculture to be of the order of 15%-20%. Da-Rocha and Restuccia (2003) choose a 
labor income share of 10% using an average of employment compensation relative to 
GDP adjusted for proprietor’s income in the farm sector from the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. As a result of these difficulties, we will conduct our simulations 
under alternative values for this parameter, which is crucial for the evolution of the factor 
shares. 
Figure 3 compares the transitional dynamics of our calibrated economy with those 
in the actual data. The rapid growth of agricultural productivity leads, not only to a 
massive reallocation of resources from agriculture to manufactures, but also to an 
important increase in aggregate output. As in post-war Europe this type of structural 
change is characterized by high and slowly declining growth rates, nonetheless the model 
predictions substantially understate the growth performance during the Golden Age. This 
growth differential translates into an increasing gap between the share of agriculture in 
GDP predicted by the model and the one observed in the data, even under the assumption 
that consumption of the agricultural commodity is subject to satiation. In our model 
economy, the only storable commodity is manufacturing output therefore the progressive 
migration of labor between sectors leads to a transition characterized by a monotonically 
increasing saving rate, in line with the increases observed in postwar Europe. This 
increase in investment combined with the diminishing returns to capital exhibited by our 
                                                 
9 Jorgeson and Gollop (1992) estimate that productivity growth has been high in agriculture relative to 
service and manufacture sectors for East Asian countries. In the European context, Postman (1967) reports 
10-year increases in agricultural productivity for Germany (76%), Denmark (45%) and the Netherlands 
(20%). Our calibrations of the rate of technological change in the traditional sector are consistent with this 
evidence. Cobb-Douglas technology lead to a smoothly increasing capital-output ratio qualitatively 
similar to the path observed in the data. Finally, our calibrated model, although 
qualitatively predicts the evolution of the labor share in income, is not able to capture the 
extent of this process. In order to maximize the explanatory power of our model on this 
issue, we reduce the labor share parameter in the agriculture production function down to 
.05, well below any relevant empirical evidence. Even under this extreme assumption, 
our model is only able to generate a 8% increase in the wage share, well below the 12% 
increase observed over the 20 years period. As a result, we conclude that post-war 
evolution of the labor share cannot be fully explained in terms of the reallocation of labor 
from a traditional agricultural sector to manufactures, and therefore we might need to 
abandon the familiar Cobb-Douglas world, with its unitary elasticity of substitution 
between factors, in favor of a more flexible production structure to be able to account for 
this pattern. 
 
4. The Marshall Plan and the role of government productive expenditure. 
The Marshall Plan transferred $13 billion in aid from the United States to Western 
Europe between 1948 and 1951. In terms of the donor’s national income the transfers 
represented 2.1% of GNP in 1948, rising to 2.4% in 1949 and then falling down to 1.5% 
the remaining two years. In absolute terms, over the four-year period of the plan, $2.7 
billion went to France,  $1.5 billion to Italy, and $1.43 billion to Germany. Aid was not 
allocated in any fixed proportion to national income but on average the per year transfers 
amounted 2.5% of GDP for France, 2.2% for Italy, 1.1% for Germany, close to 4% for 
the Netherlands and even a higher percentage for Austria, according to the calculations of 
the Bank of International Settlements reported by Milward (1984). 
During the cold war years American scholars sought to demonstrate a cause-effect 
relation between the Marshall Plan and the remarkable economic performance in post-
war Europe. In De Long and Eichengreen (1991) terminology, the “folk wisdom” of 
international relations argues that the Marshall Aid provided enough funds to finance 
public expenditure, to eliminate bottlenecks that obstructed economic growth, to 
guarantee the much needed flow of imports and for private investment in a period of 
relatively low domestic saving rates. Mayne (1973), Gimbel (1976) and Mee (1984) 
support this vision of post-war Europe. Milward (1984) downplays substantially the importance of the Plan. He argues 
that the post-war European growth record would not have been very different in its 
absence. Nonetheless, he admits that the Plan helped governments to widen bottlenecks 
in the recovery process, where this was dependent on public investment. 
Maier (1987) and De Long and Eichengreen (1991) prefer an interpretation that 
stresses the importance of the Plan to guarantee the continuity of market or quasi-market 
institutions providing room for a new growth oriented social contract. 
As a first step to assess the economic impact of the Plan it is important to 
understand the allocation of the aid. Around 32% of the aid was devoted to food imports, 
almost 15% to cotton imports, 4.4% to tobacco, 15.5% to fuel with the remaining 33% 
evenly distributed between raw materials and capital goods. De Long and Summers 
(1992) highlight the connection between equipment investment and growth, along this 
line, imports of capital goods amounted 23.4% of the total aid in France, 20.6% in Italy, 
3.3% in Germany, 24.2% in the Netherlands and 11.3% in Austria. These imports were 
mainly directed towards infrastructure development, such as electricity, gas, power 
supply, transport and communications. These are the “commanding heights” of the 
economy, i.e. those sectors which needed to expand before the rest of the economy could. 
Barro (1990) recognizes the important interactions between productive 
government spending and growth. Furthermore, the introduction of public capital as an 
input in the aggregate production function leads to an important role for public 
investment in the growth process. Along these lines, Saint-Paul (1993) highlights the 
positive role played by the French government providing the economy with modern 
infrastructure after the war. In the case of Italy, Postan (1967) points out that government 
sponsored agencies pioneered important industrial projects and build up the Italian road 
system. In the next section, we present a model that allows us to quantify the joint effects 
of productive government expenditure and foreign aid in the post-war period. 
 
4.1 A model with productive public capital and foreign aid. 
4.1a The Private Sector 
We consider an economy populated by single representative household whose 









− ∫    (4.1) where C denotes consumption, 1 σ  is the elasticity of substitution between consumption 
at two points in time and β is the rate of time preference. The representative firm 
produces output, Y , combining private capital, K , and public capital or infrastructures, 









− ⎡⎤ == ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
   (4.2) 
The firm faces decreasing returns to scale in the private factor, and constant returns to 
scale in both factors, as in Futagami, Morita and Shibata (1993). The model abstracts 
from labor, so that private capital should be interpreted broadly to include human, 
technological, as well as physical, capital as argued by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). 
Private capital, that depreciates at a rate,  K δ , is accumulated out of income net of taxes, 
τ , after allowing for consumption net of lump sum foreign transfers, T . Therefore the 
law of motion of the private capital stock is, 
() 1 K KY C K τδ =− −− + & T    (4.3) 
Thus we assume that the representative agent maximizes his utility function, (4.1), 
subject to the budget constraint, (4.3), and treating the stock of public capital,  , as 
given and independent of his own decisions. The optimality conditions for this problem, 
where 
G K
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together with the transversality condition, 






The interpretation of (4.7) is standard. (4.7a) equates the marginal utility of consumption 
to the shadow value of capital and (4.7b) is an intertemporal allocation conditions 
equating the net marginal physical product of private capital to the rate of return on 
consumption. 
Log differentiating (4.7a) and combining the result with (4.7b), we reach the 
following law of motion for the growth rate of consumption, 
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4.1b Public Sector and the Marshall Plan 
In order to replicate the effects of the American aid after World War II, we allow 
our economy to receive a temporary transfer. We model this transfer as a constant 
fraction of output,  . Furthermore we allow for a percentage of the transfer,  mY ξ , to be 
tied to the provision of public infrastructures. Aside from foreign aid, we assume the 
economy is closed and therefore the domestic stocks of private and public capital 
uniquely determine the equilibrium interest rate
11. The model could be easily extended to 
an open economy set up, but for the purpose of our analysis this distinction is irrelevant. 
The government in our economy obtains resources for the provision of public 
infrastructures from two sources: domestically financed government expenditure, G , and 
the tied proportion of the Marshall aid,  mY ξ . In order for an equilibrium growth path to 
be sustained, the current flow of government expenditure in infrastructure must be tied to 
the size of the economy. As a result, we model it as a constant fraction of output, g , 
therefore, 
Gg Y =       (4.9a) 
( ) t GG m Y g m Yg Y ξξ =+ = + = t    (4.9b) 
We assume that new output and the tied fraction of foreign aid can be transformed 
costlessly to new public capital. Therefore government capital, that depreciates at the 
rate,  G δ , accumulates in accordance with, 
GG G t G G K GK g YK δ =− = − & δ   (4.10) 
Finally, we assume that the government balances the budget every period through a 
proportional tax on income,  g τ = . The untied proportion of the Marshall aid, ( ) 1 t m ξ − , 
enters the resource constraint as a pure transfer, of the Keynes-Ohlin type. As a result, 
                                                 
11 Under the strict capital controls of the early Bretton Woods agreement the closed economy assumption 
seems a sensible one. The Articles of Agreement of the IMF limited convertibility to current account 
transactions with  the intention to reduce the instability created during the interwar period by private capital 
flows. In this line, Saint-Paul (1993) characterizes the French economy as “exchange controls prevailed, 
imports were severely restricted, the market for foreign exchange was severely regulated and segmented 
with a complicated system of multiple exchange rates.” In this context, the close economy assumption 
under which the return to capital is the equilibrium price of the domestic market for loanable funds seems 
more realistic than an open economy assumption under which the return to capital is pinned down by the 
prevailing world interest rate. combining (4.3) with the balanced budget condition and our description of the Marshall 
aid we reach the following aggregate resource constraint, 
  ( ) ( ) 11 Kt t K KYm YC Kg Y g m YC K δξ =+ −− − =−+− −− & δ    (4.11) 
 
4.2 Macroeconomic equilibrium. 
 
We define a stable growth path as one along which, aggregate output, private and 
public capital, and consumption are growing at the same constant rate, so that the output-
capital ratio and the ratio of public to private capital remain constant. Since our objective 
is to analyze the behavior of the economy about this long-run equilibrium it is convenient 
to define the following variables,  G zKK = and  cC K = , that remain stationary along 
such a path. Rewriting our system in terms of these stationary variables we get the 
following set of dynamic equations, 
() ()
1 11 tG t
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 (4.12b) 
Imposing the equilibrium condition, 0 zc = = & & , (4.12a) and (4.12b) determine a 
pair of nonlinear equations in  and  that may or may not be consistent with a proper 
steady state where   and  , Futagami et al. (1993) and Turnovsky (2000) 
provide sufficient conditions for this equilibrium to be well-defined and evaluate the 
dynamic properties of associated linear system. The common steady state growth rate of 
consumption, output and the two capital stocks may be expressed in the following form, 
* z
* c
* 0 z >
* 0 c >
() () () () ()
1 ** * * * * 1 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ 11 Gt G CKK Y gm z g z
ηη
K ξ αδ η δ β
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 (4.13) 
Since the steady state gap generated by a temporary increase of government expenditure 
of the order of the Marshall Aid is relatively small, we will work with a linearized 
version of (4.12). 
 
4.3 Numerical Analysis. 
We calibrate our model to reproduce some of the key features of the post-war 
period. The proportion of government investment in income is set equal to .15 the 
average value of non-military government expenditure in our sample of economies during the two decades that followed the war. The elasticity of output to public 
infrastructures is set to 0.2, within the range of consensus estimates
12. The rates of 
depreciation of private and public capital are set equal to 0.05, a non-controversial value. 
The scale parameter in the production function is set to produce a steady state growth rate 
of 2 %. The preference parameters are set equal to the ones in the previous section 
leading to a rate of consumption out of disposable income slightly above 60 % and a ratio 
of public to private capital close to 35%. We model the Marshall Plan as a temporary 
transfer, being known from the outset that will last only 4 periods, with one-third of the 
aid tied to the provision of infrastructure, therefore we set  0.025 t m = for the first four 
periods and  0.33 ξ = . 
Figure 4 summarizes the adjustment path of some key economic variables and 
growth rates. One third of the aid is directly channeled into public investment leading to 
an increase in the stock of infrastructures. This stock grows almost half a percentage 
point above its equilibrium growth rate. The untied portion of the transfer increases the 
resources available for private use allowing for a simultaneous increase in consumption 
and private investment. Nonetheless the increase in private investment is not enough to 
compensate for the increase in infrastructures and the ratio of public to private capital 
begins to increase. This increases the marginal product of private capital leading to a 
period characterized by an increasing investment rate that reduces the level of 
consumption. On average private capital grows more than one fourth of a percentage 
point above its equilibrium growth rate while the Marshall program is in place. On 
average the plan increases the growth rate of output by one third of a percentage point 
during the four years that is in place
13. At the end of the forth period the resources 
available for private and public use are again limited by the level of domestic production, 
as a result the rate of public investment returns to its initial level and the rate of private 
investment decreases by almost two percentage points. With private capital growing 
slightly faster than public capital, the rest of the transition is characterized by a 
                                                 
12 See Gramlich (1994). 
13 The response of output growth to the share of productive government investment in GDP,  g , depends 
crucially in the relation between the optimal g and the current  g . In general, the growth-maximizing share 
of government expenditure is attained where the marginal benefits to productivity just match the unit 
resource costs of the additional government expenditure. Under Cobb-Douglas technology this just reduces 
to the condition that the expenditure share equal the production elasticity of the public input. In our 
example, both the temporary increase in  g , and the tied portion of the Marshall plan move temporarily the 
level of public government expenditure closer to its optimal level. monotonic decrease in the ratio of public to private capital, private savings and 
consumption. 
Our quantitative results support Milward’s (1984) claim that the contribution of 
the Plan was “greatly exaggerated by the cold war historians”. Overall the joint effect of 
aid and investment in infrastructures is not large enough to represent a significant 
stimulus.  
 
5. The role of international trade 
The potential effects of international trade in growth are well known; expanded 
trade allows an economy to shift resources into more productive uses, fosters competence 
limiting the power of domestic monopolies, increases the size of the market enabling 
important economies of scale to be realized and accelerates the process of technological 
diffusion. Along these lines, several authors highlight the role of international trade in the 
post-World War II European experience.  
Milward (1984) emphasizes that the combination of an important cluster of 
technological innovations in the late thirties (TV, washing machine, refrigerators) with 
the beginning of the process of European integration increased substantially intra-
European trade characterized by high technology composition. The increase in trade, by 
favoring the process of technological diffusion, might accelerate the growth rate of total 
factor productivity as Llewellyn and Potter (1982) highlight. It is well known that World 
War II represented a turning point between an interwar period in which autarkic policies 
where dominant and a period in which trade underwent a strong and sustained increase. 
When we turn to specific country studies, Giersch et al. (1993) underline the 
importance of the German import liberalization, later followed by the formation of the 
EEC customs union, as a method of opening domestic markets to competitive forces from 
abroad. As they point out by 1960 West Germany’s shares of world imports and exports 
exceeded those that the much larger German Reich had attained before the war, this 
factor combined with a favorable evolution of the terms of trade lead to a stage 
characterized by export-led growth. According to Hennings (1982) one of the outstanding 
features of the post-war period is the extent to which the role of international trade 
increased. He stresses the high proportion of German exports with income elasticities 
above unity and the integration in Western Europe as two of the key factors behind the 
outstanding German growth record. Van Rijckeghem (1982) reaches similar conclusions in the Dutch case. Saint-Paul (1993) downplays the relevance of trade volume 
emphasizing the importance of trade structure, where intra-European trade progressively 
replaced trans-Atlantic trade. 
 Figure 5 illustrates the evolution of the degree of openness –exports plus imports, 
measured as a share of national product– for our sample economies. Interestingly, a 
decomposition of this measure by trade partner allows to identify intra-European trade as 
the only source for the observed increase. The creation of the EEC and the tariff and 
quota reforms
14 initiated in 1959 propitiated an environment where intra-European trade 
increased by a factor of 3 in the following decade and a half, thereafter remaining 
relatively stable. 
These patterns combined with the evidence provided by Warner and Sachs (1995) 
and Frankel and Romer (1999) on the positive effects of trade on growth suggest the 
relevance of the process of regional integration as one of the key factors behind the 
European Golden Age.  
 
5.1 A neoclassical model of trade and growth. 
In this section we turn to a simplified version of the model presented by Ben-
David and Loewy (1998) that allows us to capture the effects regional integration and 
trade in technological diffusion. Our economy is populated by an infinitely-lived 
representative agent, that derives satisfaction from the consumption of two distinct goods, 
according to the following preference specification, 
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14 Beginning January 1
st of 1959, tariffs where reduced 10% per year and quotas were increased by 20% per 
year. By 1968, all legal barriers among members where in fact eliminated. See Ben-David (1994) for a 
complete account of the process of elimination of these barriers.  D
t E is the level of technology available to the domestic representative fir where  m at time 
t. Norm ing the price of domestic output to one and denoting price of foreign goods in 
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of  trade we postulate the following law of motion for domestically available technology, 
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In autarchy,  t v nology grows at the exogenously determine 0 = , domestic tech d 
growth rate, x. But  r economy trades, it becomes exposed to foreign competition 
assumption is that trade allows for the diffusion of knowledge. 
To account for the effects of the EEC we introduce a tim
as ou
and technology experiencing a faster path of technological change. Our underlying 
e varying tariff,  t τ , that 
decreases at a constant rate exponential rate,  0 ρ < . We assume that the governm nt in 
our economy devotes this tariff to non-productiv ulated out of 
output net of depreciation, 
e
e uses. Capital is accum
δ , after allowing for domestic consumption and the purchase 
of foreign goods according to the following law of motion, 
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5.2 Macroeconomic Equilibrium. 
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Finally, to evaluate the effects of the European Common Market it is sensible to 
assume
  
(5.5a) equates t lity of domestic consumption to the shadow value
tal, (5.5b) equates the marginal utility of imported consumption to the shadow 
value of capital adjusted for tariffs and foreign prices and (5.5c) is an intertemporal 
allocation condition equating the marginal product of capital to the rate of return on 
consumption. 
 that the levels of technology were similar between the founding members, and by 
definition intra-European trade is balanced, since the imports of one member are the 
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Following our previous definition of a balanced growth path it is convenient to 





reach the following system
≡≡ . Combining these definitions with (5.2), (5.4), (5.5) and (5.6), we 
 of differential equations where for simplicity we suppress the 
time subscripts, 
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That together with the time path of tariffs imposed by the Treaty of Rome,  ˆ τ ρ = , 
fully de
Imposing the steady state condition
termines the dynamic behavior of our economy 
  0
D ck τ = == & && , we can solve for the steady 
state value of the tariff 
* 0 τ = . Combining (5.7a) and (5.7b) leads to a polynomial 
equation on 
* k  with only one of the roots satisfying (5.5d). To proceed with our analysis we linearize (5.7) around its steady state, the resulting system exhibits saddlepoint 
behavior for a wide range of parameter values and we shall focus our attention on that 
case, as being the plausible one. 
5.3 Numerical Analysis.  
We calibrate our model to reproduce some of the key features of our sample of 
economies in post-war period. The rates of time preference and depreciation and the 
elasticities of intertemporal substitution and output to capital are set equal to those in 
section 3. As a result, before the process of economic integration, the steady state interest 
rate is around 7.5 %, savings out of disposable income is 22.5% and the exogenous rate 
of technological change is set so that the equilibrium growth rate is 2 %. This model has 
two additional parameters, ρ and  γ , the rate of decrease of tariffs and the relative 
importance of imported goods in the determination of welfare respectively. The former is 
pinned down by the conditions set in the Treaty of Rome that phase out the existing trade 
barriers by 1970. The latter is set in such a way that after economic integration the steady 
state level of intra-European openness is close to 20%, the average level in our sample 
economies between 1970 and 1980. Finally we need to choose the initial level of tariffs. 
Data on trade barriers is ambiguous and difficult to interpret. Calculations based on 
Balassa (1965) suggest that the level of effective tariff protection in our sample 
economies in 1958 ranged from -9% (pig iron and ferromanganese) to 58% (textile 
fabrics), excluding the effects of subsidies, quotas and administrative barriers. 
Calculations based on the same source lead to an effective tariff rate in consumer goods 
in the range of 40%. An alternative calibration approach will choose the initial tariff rate 
to be consistent with the degree of intra-European trade of our sample economies before 
1959. We follow this alternative. 
In the following exercise we assume that our economy is moving along a stable 
growth
f this exercise. The first panel compares the 
actual path of the tariffs reductions reproduced from Jensen (1968) and Ben-David (1993) 
                                                
 path until 1959, where the provisions eliminating tariff protections are introduced, 
at that moment forward looking agents fully anticipate the future evolution of tariffs and 
re-optimize their consumption choices
15. 
Figure 7 reproduces the results o
 
15 An alternative approach would assume that the change in tariffs was anticipated, under these 
circumstances the jump in consumption would take place when the information becomes public. with th
far from providing a full account of 
the eve
ons 
In the two decades that followed World War II, Western European economies 
interrupted period of growth and stability. Since then, economists have 
been tr
ual suspects: Large migrations from agriculture to 
e one simulated by our model. The second panel compares the actual and 
simulated paths of the degree of openness. Before economic integration, along the initial 
stable growth path, the degree of intra-European openness remains constant at a level 
slightly above 8%. The decrease in tariffs increases the resources available for private 
use. Under those circumstances consumption of domestic and imported goods increases, 
the change in relative prices lead to an increase in the share of imported good relative to 
domestic goods. The initial increase in consumption does not fully absorb the increase in 
disposable income and investment increases at impact, the increase in investment leads to 
a process of capital accumulation, but as the degree of openness of our economy 
increases, the rate of technological change increases and saving does not increase fast 
enough to prevent the (normalized) capital stock from falling. The rest of the transition is 
characterized by a monotonic decline of capital, output and consumption until the new 
steady state characterized by a lower level of normalized capital is reached. The change 
in output per capita is driven by two forces; the growth in technology and the process of 
capital accumulation. In the first periods of the transition the process of capital 
accumulation increases the growth rate of output by almost half a percentage point 
relative to its initial steady state value. By the time that capital begins to decumulate, the 
rate of technological change is fast enough to prevent the growth rate of output to fall 
below its previous equilibrium level, nonetheless the process of capital dilution depresses 
the growth rate of output per capita that remains below its new intertemporal equilibrium 
level of 2.2% the rest of the transition. This growth effect of trade is in line with the 
calculations of De Long (1997) for the same period. 
Under our assumptions, we can conclude that the role of the integration process in 





ying to understand the sources behind this growth miracle. In this paper, we 
present fully specified models to quantify the contributions of the most relevant 
hypothesis presented in this literature. 
Our results suggest that the “stylized facts” of the European Golden Age are 
difficult to rationalize in terms of the usmanufa
 
In the W
ctures, the Marshall Plan and public investment, and intra-European trade. On one 
hand these results strengthen our confidence in the relevance of the reconstruction 
hypothesis, the identifying assumption behind Alvarez-Cuadrado (2004), on the other 
hand these findings refine our understanding of the post-war period by providing 
quantitative evidence on the relative magnitude of some of the additional forces at work. 
Furthermore, our results provide some interesting insights on the substantial 
reduction in the growth rate of output during the seventies that may be worth exploring.
estern European context, standard quantifications of the productivity slowdown 
that fail to account for the important role played by internal migrations, might overstate 




 Tables and Figures 
  
  France Germany  Italy  Austria Nether. Canada  Austral.  US 
Growth rates  4.09  5.69 5.18 5.17 3.38 2.64 2.48 2.47
1950-1960 3.84  7.73 5.40 6.21 3.12 2.15  1.84 2.15
1960-1970 4.36  3.45 4.93 4.02 3.67 3.19  3.17 2.83
() 55 70 KY
− Δ   19% 17% 13% 22% 15% -7% -2% -5%
50 62 Sav − Δ   45% 25% 39% 12% 23% 0% 5% -8%
62 65 Sav − Δ   4% -3% -10% 4% -3% 10% 1% 4%
() 50 70 wL Y
− Δ   11.44% 11.62% 19.04% 0.17% 12.08% -2.66% -3% 3.03%
Table 1 Some stylized facts of the transitional path after a large destruction of capital. Growth rates are reported in per year terms. 
 
Preference Parameters  2.5; 0.02 σ β = =  









Growth rate  2 % 
Saving rate  0.24 
Output-Capital ratio  0.3 
Capital share  0.40 
Net return on capital  7% 
Table 2.  Benchmark parameters and steady state values section 3. 
 
Preference Parameters  2.5; 0.02 σ β = =  
Technological Parameters  0.2 η = , 0.22, 0.05 K α δ = =  
Gov. Exp. Parameters  0.15 g =  
Marshall plan parameters  0.025, 0.15 t m ξ = =  
Growth rate  2 % 
Private Saving rate  0.39 
Public-Private Capital ratio  0.38 
Table 3.  Benchmark parameters and steady state values for section 4. 
 
Preference Parameters  2.5, 0.14, 0.02 σ γβ = ==  
Technological Parameters  0.4, 0.05, 0.2 α δρ = == −  
Growth rate  2%,   2.2% 
Saving rate (out of 
Disp Y )  22.5%,   22% 
Output-Capital ratio  0.32 
Capital share  0.40 
Net return on capital  7.5%,  8% 
Intra-European Openness  8%,  19% 
Table 4.  Benchmark parameters and steady state values for section 5 before and after integration. 
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Figure 3. Transition from agriculture to manufacturing. 
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Figure 5. Evolution of the degree of openness.  
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  30Appendix: Data Sources and Programs 
For expositional purposes, we choose to report five-year moving averages for 
each country and variable. Aggregate data is calculated using real GDP Geary-Khamis 








Data on employment share on agriculture is from the following sources; OECD 
(1963, 1972)  and GGDC (2004). We use table II. Labour force entry 5. Civilian 
employment to complete the data on civilian employment provide by GGDC (2004). 
Unemployment is from table II. Labour force entry 4. Unemployed. Population employed 
in the agricultural sector is from table III. Civilian Employment entry 2. Agriculture, 
hunting, forestry, and fishing. We calculate the share of agriculture in the labor force as 
(Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing/( Civilian employment + Unemployed). 
Data on the weight of agriculture on GDP is from OECD (1969, 1973). We use 
table  3. Gross domestic product at market prices by industry of origin entry 1. 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing and entry 15. Gross domestic product at market prices . 
The share of agricultural output is calculated as (1. Agriculture, forestry and fishing)/(15. 




The figures about the Marshall Plan are from Milward (1984) pg. 90-113. Data on 
government expenditure share of GDP is from the following sources is from Heston et al. 
(2002) (kg / government expenditure in constant prices). 
Data on the weight of defense expenditure as share of government expenditure is from 
OECD (1969, 1973). Using table 1. National product and expenditure entry 2.a Defense 
and entry 2. Government current expenditure. Non-military government expenditure is 
then calculated as (kg / government expenditure in constant prices)*(1-((2.a Defense)/ (2. 




We use a measure of openness in current prices (openc /  Openness in current 
prices) from  Heston et al. (2002). The data on intra-European trade is from ICPSR 7628 




  The programs for section 4 and 5 are coded in Mathematica. The programs for 
section 3 are coded in Matlab. All of them are available from the author. 
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